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that ". . . the bill then offers to deliver possession of said turpentine
location to defendant company at any time that may be designated
by the court . . .,"17 implying that such an offer might be necessary
to sustain a bill for rescission when the vendee had possession. The
question of right to possession during the suit was not, however,
before the Court.
The Florida Supreme Court in Dekle v. Noone' 8 and Willis v.
Fowler1" expressly recognized the necessity that the vendee offer
in the pleading to restore possession to the vendor. In the former
case the vendor's demurrer was sustained on several grounds, including the failure of the vendee to allege that he ever offered to restore
possession prior to the suit or in the bill itself. In the latter, the
Court gave as one reason for remanding that the complainant vendee
should amend his bill to allege that he received the property and
offered to restore it.
The Florida Supreme Court has not decided the right of the
vendee to retain possession pending his suit at law, based on rescission,
20
for return of the purchase money. In one case, however, the Court
implied that an offer to restore possession or the consideration would
be sufficient.
This case clarifies the law of Florida in that a vendee now suing
in equity for rescission of a contract of realty on grounds of fraud
may retain possession of the property pendente lite. He must, however,
offer to return it in conformity with the terms of the decree he seeks.
GEORGE W. WRIGHT, Jn.

FLORIDA HOMESTEAD: AVAILABILITY OF EXEMPTION
AFTER DIVORCE
Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1950)
Plaintiff was awarded a divorce from defendant husband and
given complete custody of their two minor' children. The chancellor
ordered that defendant pay ten dollars per week for support of the
17Id. at 521, 51 So. at 552.
1894 Fla. 1211, 115 So. 514 (1928).
19102 Fla. 35, 136 So. 358 (1931).
20

See Cox v. Grose, 97 Fla. 848, 853, 122 So. 513, 515 (1929).
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children, and that the home, owned by the parties as tenants by
the entirety, be henceforth held as a tenancy in common.' He reserved
jurisdiction to make further orders regarding the home, in which defendant alone continued to live. Plaintiff remarried and later sought
the support money, which was unpaid. The chancellor entered a
declaratory order holding this a lien on the home, over defendant's
claim of homestead realty exemption 2 against levy or a $1,000 homestead personalty exemption if the property should be sold. On appeal,
HELD, order holding this a lien affirmed.
Three grounds were given: (1) the divorced husband was not
the head of the family; 3 (2) homestead exemption does not apply
to intra-family debts; and (3) the chancellor had retained jurisdiction
with regard to the real estate. Rehearing was denied with opinion.
Each ground was by itself sufficient to warrant affirmance; but the
first ground, as distinct from the decision, raises serious problems.
As to the third ground, it is well settled that property rights
existing between husband and wife may be the appropriate subject
of litigation in divorce proceedings, 4 and that a court may modify
its order with regard to real estate over which it has retained
jurisdiction.0
As regards the second ground, the Court properly denied the bar
of homestead exemption as against intra-family debts; a contrary
holding would defeat the very purpose for which the Florida Constitution created this exemption.6
In enunciating the first ground, the Court unfortunately did not
accept the stipulated statement of facts in this regard;7 and in its
failure to do so it curtailed without adequately analyzing the unani'Divorce automatically renders the two spouses tenants in common, FLA. STAT.
§689.15 (1941), Markland v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629, 21 So.2d 145 (1945).
2
For a treatment of Florida homestead law in all its aspects see Crosby and
Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption: I-V, 2 U. oF
FLA. L. Rxv. 12, 219, 846 (1949).
sOn family headship see Crosby and Miller, supra note 2, at 24-29.
4
Francis v. Francis, 183 Fla. 495, 182 So. 833 (1938).
rAndruss v. Andruss, 144 Fla. 641, 198 So.. 213 (1940).
GSee Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177, 186 n.11 (App. D.C. 1940);
Spengler v. Kaufman & Wilkinson, 46 Mo. App. 644, 650 (1891); the leading
Florida authorities as to the purpose of the homestead exemption are assembled,
in Crosby and Miller, supra note 2, at 18-16.
7The propriety of disregarding a stipulation of a conclusion, of fact is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
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mous decision in Osceola Fertilizer Co. v. Sauls,8 in which homestead realty exemption was granted, against an outside creditor, to
a divorced husband supporting his ex-wife and their child in her
custody from the citrus grove on which he resided permanently.
The primary distinction given in the instant opinion is that
Sauls supported his divorced wife and minor child from the rural
homestead, whereas the Anderson homestead, an urban residence,
was not being used for support of the children; in fact, the father
furnished them nothing. As an incidental reason, the Court mentioned
the fact that Osceola Fertilizer Company was an outside creditor;
but this vital basis of differentiation from the principal case, in which
the creditor was Anderson's ex-wife and the debt was support money
ordered paid by the chancellor, was not stressed. Instead, the Court
held that Anderson ceased to be the head of the family when he
lost custody of the children and failed to comply with the support
decree.
The implications of this were apparently not realized. Can a
father, by refusing to support his children, remove the mantle of
protection given them by Florida homestead law as established by
the Court in a long line of decisions? 9 It is difficult to believe that
the Court intended any such result; yet it follows logically from this
first ground that a divorced father is free to devise the homestead
realty to anyone he chooses, by the simple expedient of refusing to
support his children after divorce. He can of course convey or mortgage it even though the head of a family, because he no longer has
a spouse available for joinder; 10 but as a family head without a
spouse he still cannot devise it." The first ground of the Anderson
case, if followed as the sole ground of a future decision, would abrogate this rule of law.
Furthermore, as a result of this reasoning a divorced father, if
unable to pay support money at any given time, would find even
his home subjected to the claims of outside creditors at the very
moment when protection would be most needed in order to enable
him to meet his obligation to his children. To go a step further, let
us suppose that, after a default, he later resumes payments. Does
898 Fla. 339, 123 So. 780 (1929).
9
FLA. CONST. Art. X. The Supreme Court Rules of Descent are traced and
analyzed in Crosby and Miller, supra note 2, at 67-77, 389 n.650.

' 0 Scoville v. Scoville, 40 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1949).
11FLA. CONST. Art. X, §4.
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he then again become head of the family? If the status as head of
the family can jump back and forth between father and mother,
depending upon whether a father is current in his payments of
support money, creditors can never be sure when the homestead
exemption exists ox who is the head of the family at any given time.
It might be added at this point that, inasmuch as the ex-wife in the
principal case had remarried, the statement in the opinion that
she was the head of the family is erroneous; her new husband was
the head of a family consisting of himself and her, and also of her
minor children if they were in fact dependent on him. -2Interesting problems arise when the factual situation of this case
is varied. Assume that the husband remarries and is the head of a
distinct and separate family; his first wife does not remarry and is
unable to support the children. In Winter v. Winter' 3 the Nebraska
Court held that a divorced father cannot relieve himself of the burden of supporting his child by remarrying and claiming the benefit
of the homestead exemption law. That this position will be adopted
in Florida if and when the circumstances arise is strongly indicated
by the opinion in the principal case.
In a second hypothetical situation, assume that the wife does not
remarry but that she is nevertheless supporting minor children. She
attempts to collect support money by levying on her ex-husband's
home. The answer to this problem is suggested by a Mississippi
case 14 involving homestead but no children. The wife was awarded
alimony by the divorce decree, and her former husband subsequently
remarried. She then died without having remarried, whereupon he
claimed homestead exemption against enforcement of an order to
pay back alimony rendered prior to her death. His claim was
rejected.
In still a third situation, assume that the former husband later
marries a widow with children of her own, and that his first wife
is awarded custody of the minor children by the first marriage. She
remarries. There are then two separate and distinct families with
two separate heads. If the new husband of the first wife is unable
12

See note 3 supra.
Neb. 335, 145 N.W. 709 (1914). Thuman v. Thuman, 144 Neb. 177, 13
N.W.2d 117 (1944), although not involving homestead, reiterates the normal rule
that remarriage of the husband does not relieve him of his alimony and support
obligations.
14Felder v. Felder's Estate, 195 Miss. 326, 13 So.2d 823 (1943).
1395
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to provide properly for the children, can she enforce an order for
support money against the homestead of her ex-husband when he
too is barely able to support his present family? This problem does
not lend itself to easy solution. From a logical standpoint, the family
to which the obligation of support was first owed should have first
priority, yet payment of support money would in some instances
cause the present family of the former husband to become a ward
of the community. As a matter of public policy, two self-sustaining
families are preferable to one with more than enough and the
other supported by public relief. Of course, if the husband is financially able to support both his present family and his children by
his first marriage, he should not be allowed to escape his obligation
to the latter by reliance on homestead exemption. If, however, he
is able to support only one family, then a policy decision must be
made; and the basic homestead policy is to minimize the number
of public wards.
These problems are not presented in the principal case, but they
may well arise. The decision in itself is correct; but the first ground
of the opinion, namely, that the former husband was no longer the
head of the family, is erroneous, it is submitted. Should this be
adopted as a sole reason in the future, it will lead to undesirable
consequences by allowing any creditor to levy against homestead
property and by encouraging the father to will the property away
from his children.
Further, it does violence to the principle of homestead law, firmly
established prior to this opinion, that the legal duty to support
dependents establishes family headship. The legal obligation itself
is the important factor-not the mere question as to whether at some
given time the father happens to be obeying or disobeying the order
of the court. It is submitted that the correct basis for the decision,
aside from the reservation of jurisdiction by the chancellor, is the
unavailability of homestead exemption as a bar against support
claims of the very dependents it was designed to protect. So viewed,
the decision adds specifically another sound principle to the Florida
law of homestead exemptions.
WELCOM HENRY WATSON
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